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Among the many issues raised as part of the "other minds" problem, is the 
discovery of the ways which justify inferring from public behaviour  the existence of 
mental predicates in others. How does one "go beyond" physical moves, dynamical 
patterns of spatial displacement of bodily segments, to interpret these as buying a 
ticket, throwing a ball to a dog, expressing joy? A traditional theory suggests that 
understanding others presupposes understanding oneself. If a subject enjoys access 
to her own inner states while she acts, she may be able to use analogical reasoning to 
attribute to others intentions, beliefs and desires corresponding to her own 
(Armstrong, 1968). 
This way of framing and answering   the problem  draws on the intuition that 
self-knowledge  is the secure ground on which knowledge of others might be gained. 
This classical way of putting the problem may raise various objections. One may  
question the Cartesian assumption according to which we learn about ourselves 
through introspection, rather than by  collecting information about the physical and 
the social world. One may  be worried by the verificationist flavor of the choice of 
feelings and sensations as the basis for our knowledge of others. It is furthermore 
controversial that analogy might help bridging the gap between self and other minds. 
As Ryle (1949) insisted, even granting  privileged access to one's own intentions, 
analogy does not solve the problem, for others differ from me, both in their "observed 
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appearances" and  in their actions (p. 53).  Analogical reasoning does not seem to 
offer a promising route to understanding others because at best it would only allow 
understanding actions and mental events already experienced by the attributor. More 
radically,  Wittgenstein showed that analogy falls short of attributing the relevant 
mental state to another mind: understanding someone else's pain may simply consist 
in grasping  how that might hurt oneself (in another body). The analogy fails to bring 
in the notion of a different person having her own internal states. How can a wincing 
behaviour be associated by an observer with pain felt by someone else? How might an 
egocentric relation to her own action space help an agent reconstruct alien 
movements as belonging to another agent's action space?   
The traditional view on the problem of other minds  would be clarified, if not solved 
yet,  if it could be shown that the apparent gap between  introspective and social 
knowledge results from two mistakes : ignoring what can be directly perceived about 
others; and failing to acknowledge that information about oneself can be gained by 
looking at the external world. In this chapter, we will  concentrate on the reasons we 
may have to say that there is a common source of knowledge for self and others' 
intentional behaviour.  Our approach will however not directly bear on mental 
understanding, but rather on one of its preconditions: intentions, at least those of the 
most ordinary, physical kind, that give rise to bodily movements and to changes in 
the external world. 
 
 Understanding  intentions and actions : A perceptual theory  
 
How does an agent gain knowledge about her own acts? How can she identify her 
own current  intentions, and how does this capacity relate to identifying  intentions 
as driving others' observed behaviour? It does not seem prima facie  plausible to 
claim that both kinds of attribution of an intention are effected in an even remotely 
similar way. A received view  maintains that intentions are identified in self through 
non-observational knowledge, while another person's intentions are recognized 
through perception-cum-inference (Anscombe, 1957). Intention does not seem to be 
the only kind of mental event or disposition to be attributed differently according to 
its particular target - self or other - : pains, beliefs, desires, emotions,  also seem to 
allow a similar  contrast between first and third person attributions.   
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A common argument for  invoking a non-observational source of knowledge is that 
there is no apparent mediation, in this kind of case, between  evidence gathered and 
a fact to be known : one directly grasps one's own physical posture or intention to do 
P, without apparently having to identify typical sensations for being in that posture 
or having that intention. The notion of "knowledge without observation", however, 
raises the problem of  understanding  how new knowledge can be gained when no 
sensory information is collected. How is an agent in a position to recognize, for 
example, that her leg is bent, or that she intends to drink a glass of water? The 
immediate or direct character of the kind of knowledge one has of one's own limb 
position, of one's own pain or intention, is compatible with the fact that some type of 
informational access is provided to the relevant property. A plausible alternative to 
the non-observational knowledge approach consists in suggesting that a subject 
becomes aware of her being in such and such a  state through perception. After all, 
many clear-cut cases of perceptual states also have such a direct relation to their own 
contents. When for example an observer  sees a patch of red,  she does not first 
identify the sensation she has, then correlate it with some external property, to infer 
that there is some red object out there. The external fact is what she directly sees. 
A second ground for rejecting the non-observational view is linked to the demands 
it places on the relation between being in a mental state and attributing  that state to 
oneself. According to this view,   one cannot be in pain, have an  emotion, form an 
intention, without simultaneously forming the belief that one has it.1 One might 
object that pains, emotions, physical postures, intentions, often fail to be 
acknowledged by their bearer; they may be currently active in an individual  (that 
is,be contextually triggered and control her behaviour in a way essentially similar to 
conscious pains, emotions, physical postures and intentions), while being, at least for 
some time, undetected. These two arguments seem to make it worthwhile to try 
articulating in more detail  a theory of the kind of  access that an organism has of her 
own  proprioceptive and intentional states, thus grounding knowledge of one's 
current deeds, intentions and well-being  in specific informational facts, which would 
in turn be stored in memory. 
 
                                                 
1 see Shoemaker, (1996). 
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Sensory perception, generally speaking, consists in collecting information about an 
objective, independently existing world. Let us briefly summarize the ingredients 
which have to be present for some event or property to be perceived.  
 a) A perceiving subject, using specialized captors,  extracts spatial or qualitative 
bits of information on a property, event or  state of affairs, such as: 
(1) "O is presently  at P"   
(2) O has Q, R, S (color, shape, sound, texture (..) properties) 
b) Such perceptual knowledge is represented in a phenomenological way ; in other 
words, a distinct qualitative feeling  is normally associated with the perceived 
properties. Seeing involves in standard cases having a visual experience in which  a 
state of affairs is being presented to the seer2.  
c) On the basis of the information extracted by the senses, perceptual judgements 
produce a conceptual categorization of the perceived events or objects, through 
which a singular percept is subsumed under some concept : "this is a horse", "this is a 
ringing of the bell », and so on.  
d) Perceptual judgements may be either veridical or illusory : to be veridical, a 
perception must present the world as seeming to be what it actually is, and the fact 
that the world has the presented property  must be what causes the preceiver to have 
this perception. In such a causal theory of perception, which we will have to take here 
for granted, the existence of a causal link between the world and a subject's 
perceptions makes her awareness objective.  
When the relevant perceptual mechanisms are not reliable,  or when the situation 
perceived is ambiguous or specifically contrived so as to produce systematic deviant 
subjective effects, the observer may produce wrong judgments induced at a 
perceptual, rather than at a conceptual level. 
e) A basic claim of  perceptual realism, on which non-idealist philosophers  agree, is 
that the objects of perception are independent from the fact that they are being 
perceived. That there is a tree in  my visual field is true by way of there being a tree at 
a certain time and location, and my being in a position to see it, and the latter 
capacity being in part caused by the fact that there is a tree there.  In no way is the 
existence of the tree at this location contingent on my own capacity to perceive it.  In 
                                                 
2 Such a presentation conveys perceptual content in an analogical, nonconceptual mode; on this notion 
of a non-conceptual content of perception, see Evans, (1982), Peacocke (1992a), (1992b), Crane, (1992), 
Bermudez,  (1995),  (1998).  Among opponents, Armstrong (1968), McDowell, (1994). 
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other words, the existence of  perceived events necessarily lies, in a de re  mode, 
outside the scope of perceptual attributions. Any perceptual event thus essentially 
involves a counterfactual truth, to the effect that  
"For some particular object O existing at time T and location L,  had a 
non-instrumented perceiver P not been appropriately located at T in the 
relevant vicinity of  L, P would not have perceived O". 
 
Given this type  of analysis,  proprioceptive states seem to fall naturally within the 
scope of perception. 3  The existence and mechanisms of a specialized sense, 
sometimes called "muscular sense", allowing a subject to identify the types of 
postures which he currently has, have been documented by pathological cases such 
as de-afferented patients, as well as by experimental work on muscle vibration. 
Specialized sources of evidence are used to appreciate one's own kinesthetic posture.  
Muscular proprioceptive messages from various body segments (most notably, from 
eye,  neck and foot muscles) help a subject keep track of her own posture and gaze 
direction 4 . Although terms like "observation" and "perception" as employed in 
ordinary psychological idiom may sound inadequate to express this kind of 
informational extraction and use in postural judgment, this case is vision-like in all 
the main respects. Proprioception  like vision, allows   facts and objects of the spatial 
and qualitative varieties to be grasped  (the subject's head being twisted to the left ; 
her legs being bent, etc.) ; it is phenomenological, in the sense that there is 
something it is like to experience that one's leg is bent, or that one's head is twisted to 
the left.  
Moreover, a subject who feels her legs bent picks up sensory kinds of information 
to form a judgment about an independent physical fact. The latter is independent in 
the sense that the position of a limb is not constituted by the awareness of the subject 
whose body is involved. One may fail to know one's limb position for various reasons,  
including deafferentation, experimental manipulation of one's tendons and muscles, 
and so on. It may on the other hand seem to one that one's limb is in a position 
different than it actually is. Illusory  proprioceptive  states can also be produced 
experimentally by tendon vibration. A motionless subject may in those modified 
                                                 
3 For a full defense of this view, see Martin (1995). 
4 See Roll, Roll & Velay (1991). 
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conditions, for example feel her head, trunk, or whole body rotate.5 The cause of 
perceiving that one's legs are bent is that some specific muscles, tendons, and joints 
are in the particular condition which causes the brain to be in certain corresponding 
states underlying the perceiver's distinctive experience.  Proprioceptive states thus 
have a perceptual structure very similar to the visual system's.  
 
When it comes  to intentional action, a perceptual theory seems at first blush 
natural and  adequate only  in the case of a detached observation of another's 
behaviour. It is a fact of experience that when a perceiver observes someone else's 
bodily movements, she directly perceives these movements as goal-directed and 
intentional. Moreover, what is consciously perceived and stored in memory is not the 
pure sensorimotor aspect of the movement, but rather part of its teleological content, 
that is a specific  dynamic interaction between behaviour and environment, as 
involving this or that part of the body, with this kind of timing and that portion of 
space being a target of the action. These various demonstratives  refer to perceptual 
dynamical sequences which can be experienced  without a conceptual capacity 
coming into play. Now it is plausible to refer to what is immediately perceived, in this 
kind of case, as the agent's intentional action, rather than as her bodily motion.  
Several arguments substantiate the claim that specialized perceptual mechanisms 
deal with the dynamical pattern of an observed movement. Humans can easily 
discriminate a biological motion from a non-biological, mechanical movement, even 
when the cues are limited to a few luminous dots located on the moving joints, with 
no background information available (Johansson, 1977). Such an ability has also 
been shown present in 3-month old babies (Bertenthal, 1993). New borns  have 
furthermore been shown to  imitate facial movements presented in their visual field, 
such as tongue protruding, which suggests that they perceive the stimulus in the 
format of a possible action (Meltzoff & Moore, 1999). Among the perceptual features 
that an infant might be innately disposed to use as markers for intentional 
behaviour, searchers have identified  the properties of being a self-propelled 
movement,   (Premack, 1990), of having an irregular path (Mandler, 1992), and of 
exerting non rigid transformations on objects (Gibson et al., 1978). Facial and vocal 
expressions have also been cited as determining the value of the goal for the agent 
(Haviland & Lelwica, 1987). 
                                                 
5 Cf. Roll, Gilhodes, Roll & Velay, in Jeannerod ed. (1990), 549-565. 
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It will be objected here that this perceptual capacity to discriminate animate 
movements does not amount to perceiving an action with a definite intentional 
content. The recognition of an early perceptual capacity for discriminating 
intentional agency  in others should not lead one to jump to the conclusion that an 
infant attributes intentions to others, for the latter capacity involves a perceptual 
judgment using intentional concepts as well as the recognition of others as 
independent selves. Just as an infant can manipulate a toy and extract the shape and 
texture information concerning that object  without forming the judgment [that  a 
toy is in her hands ], she  may  look at the intentional action A of an agent S without  
recognizing [that S does A]. Perceving a biological movement as an action, the 
objection goes, would require applying the whole explanatory structure of human 
agency in terms of  intentions and reasons to act. 
This argument thus rejects the transition from "purely seing" a movement  that is in 
fact an action  to "seing a movement as an action",that is, it rejects the transition 
from discriminating an intentional action to perceiving it as such, on the basis of the 
additional cognitive resources that are needed for such a transition. A second 
argument would further object that such a transition is often unwarranted. A 
well-coordinated and clearly target-oriented movement may fail to be an action, for 
example when the agent did not form any intention to act, as in post-hypnotic 
compulsive behaviour, in imitation behaviour, where a subject is involuntarily 
mirroring the actions she observes, or in utilization behaviour, where she responds 
automatically to a functional stimulus.6 So even leaving aside the fact that many 
actions do not involve a physical movement - but rather a refusal to move  or speak -, 
we must recognize that an animate movement is a rather poor perceptual guide for 
action.  There is more to action than biological, target-oriented movement. 
A first way of answering these objections consists in claiming that without such an 
innate sensitivity to this kind of movement in perception, a  subject would be unable 
to apply the concept of an action to specific kinds of dynamical patterns. What is 
gained through perception is thus a sensory basis for later judgments, when the 
concept of an action is acquired (independently from perception : through language, 
learning, etc.). Now the question when a concept of intention is grasped depends in 
part on a theoretical decision about what mastering a concept amounts to. Several 
kinds of abilities have been suggested, such as an implicit ability to attribute goals in 
 J. Proust juin 14, 2007 , 16:06 
8 
preverbal communication (around 9 months), 7  interpreting  the goal-directed  
spatial behaviour as a marker of rational agency (around 12 months),8 attributing 
intentions to dolls  during play (around 20 months),9 or attributing verbally motives 
to agents (around 21 months).10  
This view thus grants that perceiving an action at a sensory level does not amount 
to perceiving an action as such, but emphasizes that perceiving actions play a major 
role in the capacity to apply the concept of an action when it is acquired. Even if the 
"animate agency" feature may be unreliable in some circumstances, it certainly is a 
precondition for reacting differently to physical objects subject to natural regularities 
and objects governed by motives.   
Let us note here a difficulty of this position when it is associated with the view that 
intentions are conceptually grasped only when a theory of mind is developed (at 
around 3 to 4 years). Surely, non-human animals are able directly to see an attack, or 
a court display, as an unmistakable dynamic pattern of behaviour associated with 
some specific target event. This type of perceptual format is exemplified in ritualized 
behaviour, whose goal is to influence the motivational states of the conspecifics in 
some predetermined way. The detailed teleological structure of ritualized behaviour 
would not be intelligible if there was no perceptual system able to extract the relevant 
intentional pattern expressed in an animal's behaviour. (Lorenz, 1983, Zahavi, 1997). 
Here again, the claim should not be understood as involving a mental attribution of 
intentions. An animal which extracts the information about its predator's intention 
does not need to have the corresponding mental concept of intention, anymore than 
an animal able to use conspecifics' signals needs to have the full mental concept of 
communication. What is claimed is only that living creatures had better be in a 
position to extract perceptual information about typical kinds of events involving  
conspecifics' or predators' agency. Even though they lack the mental concept of 
intentionality, they must be ready to acquire the perceptual knowledge that a specific 
kind of action has been launched against them, or is to involve them otherwise 
crucially. Thus they should be able to perceive the action in some dynamic, 
                                                                                                                                               
6  On these syndromes, see Lhermitte, (1983), Lhermitte et al., (1986). 
7  Harding  & Golinkoff  (1979). 
8  Gergely et al., (1995). 
9 Fenson (1984). 
10 Bretherton, McNew & Beegly-Smith, (1981). 
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action-specific format, and to categorize it according to its consequences.11 In this 
strategy, it is thus accepted that perception of animate movement constitutes, in the 
human case, a preliminary step to an understanding of action in fully 
intentional/mental terms, and, in the animal case, a specific domain of registration 
that may offer, in time, resources for teleological categorization. 
A second strategy however defends the view that the transition from perceiving an 
animate movement to perceptual judgment (where an action is seen "as an action") 
does not require a contribution from some external faculty (such as language, 
learning, etc.). In this view, infants and non-human animals have the capacity to 
judge in some implicit way that an action of some crude type is performed. This 
strategy has been adopted by those who defend a modularist conception of theory of 
mind development, such as Leslie (1994) and Baron-Cohen (1995) : detecting 
intentions is taken to be a specialized informational mechanism that responds 
automatically to perceptual inputs with predetermined features. There is no  need in 
this view to distinguish "perceiving an action" and "perceiving it " as an action", for 
the very format in which the action is perceived implies that it is dealt with as an 
action, which the subject must adequately identify and respond to. The two 
objections presented above are deflected by admitting that the proto-concept of 
action that is automatically triggered by perceptions of animate movements needs to 
be enriched and corrected in order to be part of a wider and more reliable inferential 
capacity. This proto-concept is generally restricted to categorizing a dynamic pattern 
as leading to a particular goal. Modularists standardly hypothesize that additional 
modules, such as  SAM and above all ToM, offer the kind of resources allowing a 
child to explain (in mental terms) why an agent performs an action with such and 
such an intentional content.  
We do not need at this point to arbitrate between these two strategies to deflect the 
objections above. What is clear is that, in both cases, "intentions" are taken to be 
grasped in a different way, from an early phase in which intentional actions are 
discriminated (in a sensory way, in the first view, or categorized through 
protoconcepts, in the second) to a later phase during which their representations are 
embedded within a general theory of rational agency.   
                                                 
11  We will presuppose here that non-human animals can use concepts to predict regularities in 
their environments. See Proust (2000b) 
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These considerations  should warrant a specific terminological use that will be 
adopted in the remainder of this chapter. What we tried to establish above is that the 
word "intention", which refers usually to a representation conveying the mental 
conceptual content of an action and driving its execution, needs to be extended to 
what is given in perception when another agent acts intentionally. By claiming that 
an intention, rather than the corresponding action, is perceived, we want to 
emphasize that perception offers all the evidence needed, in many ordinary cases, for 
judging -- without inference -- not only what an agent does, but what she is up to. In 
fact, the very anticipatory and teleological nature of this kind of perception makes it 
plausible to say that what is seen is an intention, and not only a developing action. 
This kind of use is not isolated: although emotions in other agents are also mental 
states with an intentional content, they are taken to be perceived early on, even when 
the corresponding concept is lacking. We now want to suggest that it also makes 
sense to say that an agent perceives her own intentions in a similar way as she does  
others'. 
 
Perceiving one's  intentions 
 
Let us first remark that, in order to draw this parallel, we need to exclude a large 
family of cases of accessing one's own intentions that are irrelevant for it. A basic 
distinction made by Searle (1983) will help us make this point. There are two classes 
of intentions, named "prior intentions" and "intentions in action". Prior intentions 
are formed prior to the corresponding actions; intentions-in-action are formed while 
the action occurs. There is a fundamental difference in the kind of knowledge one can 
have of having one or the other type of intention. For example, an agent may form 
the project to visit her uncle, and store this prior intention in memory while her 
action develops. When an agent forms a prior intention to perform action A,  she uses 
her concepts and inferential capacities to represent her goal as well as a relevant 
instrumental action. The question of how the agent knows about her own intentions, 
in that case, can be solved by way of the belief the agent entertains that she formed 
such and such an intention with such a content.  The agent may thus know  that such 
and such an intention  will control her behaviour because she remembers having 
explicitly formed this prior intention, and expects to find herself in the relevant 
context for acting.  
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This kind of case diverges from the case of third person intention-reading to the 
extent that there seems to be,  in the prior intention case,  no public or perceivable 
counterpart of the first-person, private event of intending. If we want to draw a fair 
comparison between first and third person perception of intentional action, we must 
therefore restrict our analysis to a situation in which no belief about a prior intention 
is available to the agent while she acts or at least in which such a belief is not 
sufficient for the agent to keep dynamically track of her own doings.   
Before we consider these restricted cases, let us first stress the importance of 
perceiving one's own intentions (that will be called "perception-in-action") in the 
ordinary case.  An agent who has stored  conceptual knowledge about her own goal in 
her working memory (and therefore believes she intends to A) has to check  what her 
progress towards her goal is. She must  in particular  appreciate whether her 
occurrent movement token converges to, or departs from, her pre-established target. 
Not only a concept, but a perception of the action (or element of the action) currently 
performed, is  necessary to make the necessary adjustments and corrections. 
Therefore even in the case where an agent formed a conscious prior intention, and 
carries it out at some later point in time, the agent must still have a perceptual access 
to her own developing intention. Important as it is,  that case will not be considered in 
our argument because it mixes conceptual and perceptual expectations. 
 Three kinds of cases can be used to illustrate the necessity of recognizing a 
perceptual level where  the relevant evidence might be accessed : 
1) An agent may act without having formed any prior intention : she just acts on the 
basis of an occurrent intention-in-action; scratching a bodily part, pacing about a 
room, opening a door, shifting a gear, hitting a piece of furniture out of anger, may all 
be performed in a purely automatic, non deliberate way.  In that case, to know what 
she is doing, the agent must gain access "online", so to speak, to the kind of 
intentional action she is engaged in. 
2) An agent may perform several actions at the same time. In this situation of 
divided attention, she must be able to reassess whether or not her occurrent 
behaviour conforms to her prior intentions.  
3) An agent subject to task interference may forget what the goal of  her current 
movement is.  
The view defended here will be that, in these kinds of cases, an agent must rely on a 
perceptual source of evidence to come to know what she is doing.  This will be shown 
 J. Proust juin 14, 2007 , 16:06 
12 
by checking whether the conditions listed above for   perceiving apply to these kinds 
of situations. Let us start with condition a. Having no belief currently available on 
her prior intention, an agent is left to rely on specialized captors to extract the 
relevant kind of information. Those specialized captors  - in particular an efferent 
copy mechanism, 12  that allows a subject to keep track of her own executive 
commands in the course of an action  - exploit a subset of the information available 
to the senses, namely the stimuli having to do with the anticipated feedback of the 
intended action. She perceives her own intention as the particular way in which the 
world  is given to her, that is,as a context affording some particular move or 
presenting some specific motivation-dependent saliences. In other words, an 
intention can be recognized by the specific structure and dynamics of the 
perceptual/motor field arising as a consequence of the attentional features 
associated with the intended action.  
There is again a much richer reading of an action context, in which the agent 
masters a conceptual  knowledge structure relative to that context, and hence can use 
the inferential connections inherent to this structure to deploy her behaviour 
rationally. An adult agent normally perceives her own intentions in a world already 
conceptually categorized, just as she perceives the things in the world as being trees, 
bushes, tables and chairs.  In a more basic sense, however, a context of action can be 
described in terms of vectors and trajectories, salient affordances, things with 
shapes, weights, colors and fragrances, attractive and repulsive features, and specific 
transformations. An infant presumably first senses her own intentions in such a 
sensory way; she recognizes and identifies them through their effects on her 
environment and her own body (including vision, audition, proprioception, and 
verbal labeling by parents). 
It is a commonplace of  phenomenological inquiry that an observer directly 
perceives the world as offering potential courses of action. The present approach 
claims in addition that an action transforms the world in a way  internally related to 
the intention driving the action.13 The agent can thus directly perceive her own 
intention while her action develops. The meaning of the action lies, so to speak, in 
the open. The specific organization of her visual field, resulting inter alia from her 
moving intentionally through some particular action space, is part of what is 
                                                 
12  See Feinberg (1978). 
13  See Searle (1983)  and Proust  (to appear 2) for a defense of this view.  
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perceived, a material indication of what she means to do. Among the relevant 
features for perceiving the intention driving one's behaviour are : the information on 
the trajectory, on some of the relevant steps of the action, on the temporal sequence 
of the various components of the action, on the effort involved in each,  on the 
modifications induced in the environment etc. Visual perception is able to assemble 
as a single  temporally extended batch those changes contingent on the agent's 
behaviour14.   
Now let us turn to condition b. The kind of access that a subject has to her own 
intention through the dynamic and qualitative structure of the input is also 
phenomenological, in the sense that there is a distinctive feeling associated with 
being the agent of a specific action. First, the way one's body moves is felt differently 
when the subject is active or passive. The distinctive sense of effort involved in 
voluntary actions,  whether interpreted  by Wundt  as a "sense of innervation", - 
namely, as caused by efferent commands to the muscles-, or understood by James as 
an image of peripheral sensations, seems to offer an important signal for perceiving 
actions differently when performed by self or  passively observed. This distinctive 
feeling seems, however,to be variable in intensity according to the subject's mood, 
and may even disappear in "depersonalized"  conditions sometimes occurring, for 
example, in depression and schizophrenia. As we will show below,  schizophrenic 
patients may be said to have defective mechanisms for perceiving intentions.15 At 
least in some cases, they seem unable to capture perceptually the dynamic pattern of 
their actions , thus failing to recognize their underlying efficient intention, just as an 
agnosic might look at an object composed of  a blade and a handle, while failing to 
recognize a knife.   
Beyond the specific impression related to a sense of effort, an agent also has 
distinctive qualitative feelings associated with  both passive and active movements 
including, as James shows, both the "remote effects of  the movement"- that is,the 
external events it produces - and  the "resident effects of the motion" : 
                                                 
14This information can be later used as providing the content of a visual image for the corresponding 
intention. Entertaining a prior intention before acting might thus consist  in  engaging in a 
goal-directed behaviour either on the basis of a conceptual representation of that goal, or on the basis 
of a perceptual image of a prior successful token of the corresponding intention. Cf. James, (1890), II, 
487 
15 They also have problems with forming intentions, but these perturbations  will not be 
discussed here. 
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"Not only are our muscles supplied with afferent as well as with efferent nerves, but the 
tendons, the ligaments, the articular surfaces, and the skin about the joints are all sensitive, 
and, being stretched and squeezed in ways characteristic of each particular movement, give us 
as many distinctive feelings as there are movements possible to perform" (James, 1890, II, 
488).  
But here too various ordinary or pathological conditions may prevent someone 
from perceiving what he or she is currently doing. De-afferented patients, for 
example, may fail to identify what they do in case they cannot see their limbs.  
Subjects with apraxia - who substitute incorrect actions into their own gestures - also 
have difficulty in recognizing substitution errors in the gestures performed by others 
and by themselves. In speeded situations, or under toxic influence,  normal subjects 
may also fail to consciously perceive their own intention, and act "without knowing 
what they do". 
In sum : intentions can be perceived or misperceived, prior to their being 
conceptually identified. Conditions b and c above are  fulfilled : even when no 
conscious belief is available of having formed an intention, there is some distinctly 
phenomenological way associated with perceiving intentions through the dynamic 
properties in the world contingent on one's agency. 
Condition c, that is, the ability to categorize perceived objects and properties, will 
be accommodated in a different way according to the kind of strategy used to the 
objections raised above. In a nutshell, the two strategies differ on the moment when 
categorization occurs : at the conceptual level, in the first stategy, and at a sensory, 
proto-conceptual level in the second.  In both cases, however, we use sensory 
perception to judge that this (type of) intention is currently being carried out. 
 Our approach might, however, be put in difficulty by the two last conditions in the 
list, namely d and e. According to clause d, what causes in veridical instances the 
relevant perception of an intention should be nothing other than the intention itself,   
appropriately connected to an intention detection mechanism. According to clause e, 
the perceived intentions should be shown to exist independently from the fact that 
they are perceived. 
 
Are intending and perceiving one's  intentions one and the same event?  
 
Let us start with the first of these questions. How can an intention, that is, some 
event or state of the "internal" variety,  be perceived by an agent as some external 
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property in the environment? If intention is a propositional attitude with a particular 
content, the only kind of perception that seems to make sense for it is introspection. 
The very idea of looking to the outer world to perceive one's own intentions simply 
seems to make no sense at all. Let us approach this difficulty from a different tack. 
As a content of thought, an intention may be analysed by using a classical 
distinction between what one thinks, what one thinks about, and  what one  thinks 
about it  (Prior, 1971). When one thinks that grass is green, one thinks, about grass, 
that it is green. Now an intention is by definition a representation. It differs from 
other thoughts not through its intentional content per se, but  through its direction of 
fit : world-to-mind as in desire  rather than  mind-to-world as in belief (Searle, 1983). 
Let us examine more closely the intentional content of an intention.16 When I 
intend to do P, where P , say, consists in carrying an object O from L1 to L2,  three 
dimensions of thought are similarly to be distinguished : what I think is  
(1) "I intend to do P". 
What I think about  when I think (1) is some definite property of my target O, that 
is,the final state of  the object's location : 
(2) O in L2 
What I think about it  is  
(3) that, in order to be in L2, a movement displacing O from L1 to L2 is to be 
performed. 
The present account does not exclude that I may have a conceptual access  to (1) the 
fact that I intend to do P, (2) the object with the property on which realizing P 
depends (the target), (3) what is to be done to reach the target. As was suggested 
above, a conceptual access allows a subject to memorize an intention as part of a plan 
in a propositional format. The possibility of knowing an intention conceptually 
should not however obliterate the possibility that an intention could and even should 
be identified perceptually, when the agent has no conceptual way of identifying her 
own current attempt.  
Perceptual access to an intention-in-action has to do with the dynamics of an action 
relevant for its intentional content, that is,with (3). Just as object-related visual 
perception generally allows for the extraction of a sensory property  or event  (seeing 
property F in an object, seing an object undergo some change) and forming a 
                                                 
16  The expression "intentional content" in all its occurrences in this chapter  means  "semantic 
content" rather than the content of an intention. 
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judgement, (that grass is green, seeing the breaking of the vase),   perceiving an 
intentional behaviour allows for the extraction of agent-related information about 
the dynamic properties of the world related to a target to be reached by her:   I   go  to 
the window and open it ; I duck and  avoid the  stone thrown at me.   
Now the puzzle about external versus internal evidence surfaces again in the 
following way : is an agent's "perception-in-action" (3) distinct from the  
corresponding intention-in-action or is it one and the same event? Confronting this 
question faces a serious dilemma, for if it is recognized that perception-in-action and 
intention-in-action are two ways of describing the same event, then the attempted 
theory cannot qualify as a perceptual one. As we saw, one major clause for perception 
(condition d above) is that the world having a property should cause the 
corresponding perception in the observer.   If, on the other hand, it is denied that 
they describe the same event, then the task becomes one of finding out what kind of 
relation connects perception-in-action and intention-in-action. What might seem 
problematic in this respect is that, although an intention has a world-to-mind 
direction of fit, it can nevertheless be perceived, and hence form the content of a 
mind-to-world thought. How might the same thought - the intention perceived - be 
simultaneously world-to-mind (in its executive dimension) and mind-to-world (in its 
perceptual dimension)? Furthermore, given the time lag between  when the intention 
is formed and when the world is changed , how might an intention be perceived if the 
world, so to speak, is only about to change?   
Answering these questions adequately requests the clarification of the metaphysics 
of the will. Let us start with the independency clause : how independent is 
perception-in-action from intention-in-action? Forming  an intention is the event 
through which an action is initiated:  when an intention is efficient, the world 
undergoes a change  as a causal consequence of the event of forming an intention. 
Hence an efficient intention will generally fail to coincide temporally with the 
dynamics realizing it, and with the corresponding perceptual event. Even in the case 
of an intention-in-action, where muscle contractions are triggered without any 
conscious prior intention,  the dynamics of the action depend on the cerebral process 
carrying it out. There must thus exist two events, one in which the premotor cortex is 
activated (an activation instantiating a given intention), and the other in which the 
muscular activity with the attached external changes  takes place (a corresponding 
action). It is during execution that the intention is controlling the execution, which 
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involves in part perceiving the relevant feedback. This gives us license to say that 
there are two events, one in which an intention is formed, another in which an 
intention is carried out. It is then only that it can be perceived. 
Such an independence is also manifest in the various misfirings that might occur.  
An intention token may be formed but fail to trigger and/or control the 
corresponding movement (for example, because some new intention interfered with 
the former), and therefore fail to offer visual or proprioceptive reafferences. Or it 
may guide the bodily movements, but fail to be attended to : an agent engaged in a 
lively conversation, for example, usually fails to perceive her own conversational 
gestures, for lack of attention (her attention is engaged elsewhere, and, moreover,  
they have in general a low saliency score for the speaker).  If this is granted,  then it is 
correct to claim that the process through which an intention is perceived is distinct 
from the intention itself, that is, the event-token of a type which normally  generates 
and controls  actions of that very kind.   
Once the independency clause is secured,  we are left with the first question raised 
above : how is perceiving an intention connected to the intention itself?  
 
How is perceiving related to intending?  
 
We saw above that an intention causes a bodily movement and various changes in 
the world, which can in turn be perceived. Still the representational relation between  
efficient intention and action should be distinguished from the causal connection 
between two events (forming vs perceiving an intention).  There is  an internal 
relationship between the representational content activated in the intention and the 
succession of bodily movements and interaction with the world in the corresponding 
action. Where an intention is efficient, its content is preserved in the causal process 
(from generating an intention to producing a bodily movement). What is preserved is 
the instruction (3) deployed over time by the action. This explains why a physical 
action  immediately  presents its intentional content to a perceiver. 
 Therefore we do have an answer to the first of our difficulties. There are two 
distinct events in a causal relationship: the intention beeing read in the changes it 
triggers in the perceived environment. The intention and the perception of that 
intention have the same representational content (see (3) above), but with a different 
kind of direction of fit. The very difference of fit is  a precondition for the intention to 
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control the action. What is at stake here is not only that the movement executed 
satisfies what was intended, not only that the properties in the world are changed as 
intended, but also that this execution occurred and these properties have been 
changed in virtue of that intention. The relatively  fuzzy expression "by virtue of" 
corresponds to the experience referred to above as a "sense of effort". More precisely 
stated, this experience reflects the capacity to predict the reafferences, that is, to shift 
directions of fit as often as is needed for a complete execution of the intention.  
 This kind of case again is not isolated. Consider the case when an agent A orders B 
to leave the room. If the order is obeyed, A can observe that B performs the action 
requested. What she observes  in that case is the kind of feedback that she expects 
when she utters the order. She perceives (in a mind-to-world direction of fit) a 
situation in the world that responds to her own intention (with a world-to-mind 
direction of fit). She expects the event to take place because she wants this event to 
happen, and uses her own ability and social position to have it happen. Here, too, 
there is a shift of directions of fit; one cannot act successfully without perceiving (and 
judging) how the world responds to one's attempt at changing it.  
Let us note in passing that the ability to shift directions of fit allows explaining in 
economical, "presubjective" terms, as to how a subject can get a very basic sense of 
agency even if she does not grasp the concept of subject (and does not use the 
first-person pronoun). The sense of being able in a given circumstance to predict and 
modify the world by intending and carrying out meaningful actions, that is, what is 
traditionally called the "sense of effort", involves a kind of reflexivity that does not 
involve any kind of  metarepresentation. The process of holding the conditions of 
satisfaction unchanged across the shift (from intending to perceiving the intention 
developing through reafferences) generates an implicit non-conceptual precursor of 
what could be made conceptually explicit through a metarepresentation such as "I 
perceive that I have this intention".17  
  
Now let us come to our final problem, concerning the temporal aspect of perceiving 
an intention in the dynamics of a movement. The time-lag separating the event of 
forming an intention from the intention being made manifest in the agent's 
behaviour should no more be an obstacle to perceiving intentions, as it is for 
perceiving distant auditory or, in astronomy, visual phenomena. The temporal puzzle 
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specific to intention does not lie in the fact that it is perceived in a deferred way, -- 
that is, not the common fact that the event in which it is identified is posterior to the 
event in which it is generated--,  but rather in the fact that  it can be perceived even 
before the goal is reached. To answer this puzzle, we  need to generalize a property of 
any kind of perception, that is, its aspectuality. A perceiver may perceive a tree as a 
tree even though she only perceives the outline of its branches in darkness;  one can 
perceive a bird fly away although what was perceived was a brief flinkering of a wing; 
similarly one can perceive an intentional process by being exposed to some fragment 
of a bodily movement.18 Perceiving another agent's intention  may occur either in the 
attentional posture of someone, or watching her move and displace objects, or by 
seeing her reach her goal. Similary for oneself: one's own intention, (besides the 
usual conceptual means for coding and retrieving it), can be perceived and identified 
at some point in the dynamics of (3), either very early in the saliences and dynamic 
projections in the perceived context, or later in the succession of reafferences 
generated by the bodily movements19.  
 
Intentions misperceived :  types of  ordinary failures 
 
Given that there is a capacity for consciously perceiving a developing pattern in the 
world as the substance of one's intention, a semantical problem arises. When shall 
we say that an agent identifies correctly a dynamic pattern as her intention? Might 
not the present approach encourage scepticism about intentional content, by 
allowing an agent to perceive a variety of coherent patterns as self-generated, or 
reciprocally by preventing her from perceiving her own intention in case the 
expected effects on the outer world are incongruent or lacking - in particular, when 
her intention is not  efficient?   
Let us suppose that the agent first forms intention I1, initiates the corresponding 
bodily movement, but, as a result of an interferent context, does not pursue the 
intended action : she rather engages in some other intention I2 (for example, she 
goes to her bedroom to pick up a book, but her intention is interfered with  by the 
prepotent context, and she finds herself undressing (cf. James, 1890). Or, while 
                                                                                                                                               
17  On the indexical aspect of such a thought, see Burge (1991) and Proust (to appear). 
18 On this, see Carey et al. (1997), p. 116. 
19 See Roland (1978) and Pribram (1978). 
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cooking, an agent opens the first available door (which turns out to  be to a fridge) 
instead of the desired door (of the microwave oven, for example).  Which intention, 
in the present theory, will the agent perceive -- the initial interfered action or the 
interfering one?  The answer to this question is important: the rationality of the 
agent depends on her ability to correct, and therefore first to detect a mismatch 
between the actual dynamics of the scene presented as her realized intention and her 
intention itself. How might an agent discriminate perceptually a "genuine" from an 
interfering, context-driven, action (and corresponding intentional content)? 
It is interesting to note that, in our examples, an intention supplanted another  on 
the basis of the visual perception of the context in which the current sequence of the 
action was developing. Sight of a bedroom is associated with a definite bed-time 
routine, that is, specific perceptual saliences and sequence of actions. James's case 
exemplifies the general fact that   representations of action are normally embedded 
in  canonical context representations. The latter seem to play  a major role both in 
triggering and recognizing varieties of actions.20 What happens in the two cases 
described is not that the agent misperceived her interfering intention, for she 
correctly saw herself doing what she did (undressing, opening the fridge). And it 
would be equally unfair to claim that the agent misperceived her initial intention I1, 
because her action no longer reflected I1.  One should rather say that the mishap 
occurred not at the perceptual level, but rather at the executive level: the agent failed 
to maintain  across time in working memory the appropriate  intention.  Context 
overlap allowed an intention overlap to occur. This overlap was beyond the agent's 
awareness, and as such was also in some sense beyond her cognitive control.   
It is all the more relevant to note that, on the basis of what she perceives as her 
current intention, the agent may finally judge that what she does is not what she 
meant to do. Perceiving her intention in her current action is  a condition for 
exercising her rational capacity at evaluating it, that is, understanding its irrelevance 
with respect to her present goal, and  finally  reviving her initial intention.  
Obviously, a mismatch can be detected only if what is observed can be compared 
with what was anticipated: perceiving one's present intentions is a necessary 
precondition for evaluating one's course of action. As was suggested above, the 
conceptual content of an intention, as determined when forming it, normally 
provides a template against which the current perceived  intention is evaluated. The 
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agent who conceptually formed the intention to do R by way of F'ing  gets from 
perception some specific feedback that may or may not be subsumed under the 
relevant concepts. As was stressed by William James,21 activating a  perceptual image  
of her goal certainly plays a major role in this process. Visualizing in anticipation 
what is to be done in some context allows evaluating how far the self-induced 
transformations on the environment are the desired ones, and also helps her guide 
her attention towards the relevant parts of the context. Where the agent formed an 
intention which turned out to be non-efficient, there is no dynamical scene 
developing as a consequence of that intention. Therefore the subject should detect a 
mismatch by finding no correspondence between anticipated imagery and observed 
scene.  
In some cases, the subject may falsely believe that her intention corresponds to 
what she can see, whereas in fact what she sees differs from what she does. In an 
experiment by Fourneret & Jeannerod, 22   for example, an agent perceives her 
intention as drawing a line straight ahead (because this is what she can see on a 
monitor screen), whereas she in fact draws a line at an angle (responding to an  
experimental bias affecting the feedback, unknown to her). In such a case, the 
intention controlling in fact the subject's movement coincides neither with what the 
subject can perceive nor with her conscious intention. This case, however, does not 
reflect a failure of the subject's intention detector. It rather expresses a conflict - 
experimentally orchestrated - between the visual and proprioceptive components in  
the perception of an intention. A subject might give  more weight to her vision than 
to her proprioception in appreciating her own intention because the current goal to 
be reached, in its conceptual content, is a visual property  [the drawn line as seen on 
the monitor screen  must be vertical]. This asymmetry  between vision and 
proprioception associated with the  general dominance of vision in humans  misleads 
the subjects into misperceiving their efficient intentions as that of drawing a line 
straight ahead. 
A sceptic might object to this theory that, even though an agent may perceive her 
current intention, when she actually entertains one, and conceptually recognize it on 
the basis of perceptual evidence, she might also  experience many other predictable 
                                                                                                                                               
20  Cf. Proust (to appear). 
21 James (1890), II, 497. 
22See Fourneret & Jeannerod, (1998) and  Slachevsky et al., (2001). 
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stimuli as an expression of her intention. For why after all would not the clouds, say, 
follow the path which I intend they do? To address this worry adequately, we need to 
show that an agent is able to discriminate perceptually  external events contingent on 
her action from those which occur  independently of her willful activity. 
 
Self-generated/Externally Generated Predictable Stimuli : the 
Separability Problem 
 
It is part of the phenomenology of perception that an agent expects to perceptually 
identify objects and events of a given kind (where a "kind" may be identified either 
conceptually, or through specific sensory or spatial cues). In any type of perception, 
perceivers evaluate whether things are, or fail to be, as expected. The subject may 
rely on a conscious emotional signal, a specific feeling, to discriminate between 
highly predictable, and familiar  stimuli, or conversely, stimuli that are unusual in 
their shapes, colors, frequencies, and so on. The intensity of this feeling on a 
familiarity/novelty scale is triggered by the degree of informational match between 
an incoming stimulus and stored perceptual regularities.  
A predictability signal cannot, however, be sufficient to determine that some 
perceived change is a result of one's own intention. One might even worry that the 
feeling of predictability in fact constitutes an additional source of confusion rather 
than a distinctive cue in perceiving  intentions; for if this information was all that was 
available, an agent would have much trouble discriminating the self- versus the 
externally-generated equipredictable events. 
 A traditional response to this worry is that an agent feels the world differently when 
the perceived external changes are contingent on her action or independent from it. 
This "sense of effort", also called "sense of innervation", 23, was subject to a hot 
controversy in the nineteenth century: is the effort felt when initiating an action a 
result of the feeling of resistance from the world, or a direct expression of the 
causality of consciousness ?24  
 In a functional perspective, recent empirical data  suggest  that there is a grain of 
truth both in a peripheralist and in a centralist view of sense of effort: on the one 
                                                 
23 To be distinguished from the sense of muscular tension : See Roland (1978). 
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hand, this feeling is directly related to world-directed perception ; on the other hand,   
such a perception is compared with a feedforward model of the developing dynamical 
context (Blakemore et al., 1999, 2001). The sentiment of self-induced predictable 
stimuli might depend inter alia on the intervention of a neural structure - the 
superior colliculus -  which, in the case of a self-generated action, integrates 
sensorimotor (visual or auditive) information, while failing to be activated when 
predictable stimuli are not self-generated25. In this theory, a subject does not need 
however to consciously represent the postulated feedforward model of her action to 
be able to identify a change in the environment as self-produced. A distinctive sense 
of the effort applied on bodily movements is the felt counterpart of the neuronal 
connections allowing her to identify which perceived environmental changes are 
self-produced26.   
  
 
 Intentions misperceived :  types of  pathological failures 
 
If  the discussion above is on the right track, two different kinds of misperception of 
one's intentions should occur, according to whether the content of the intention, or 
the intentional marker, is respectively  misrepresented. 
The first kind of problem is common, affecting in particular subjects sensitive to 
interference (aged subjects). In these common cases already described above, an 
agent fails to keep track of  her goal while acting, and as a consequence misperceives 
her initial intention. A contextual overlap may lead an agent to be perceiving 
intention I1 while in fact the motor sequence was initiated by intention I2. Such a 
mishap does not result, as we saw, from a perceptual failure, but rather from an 
instability of the intentions driving behaviour combined with the ambiguity of the 
reafferences (equally compatible with I1 and I2).  
A less ordinary type of case, characteristic of schizophrenic delusion of control,  
arises when an agent  correctly detects that an intention has developed, individuates 
                                                                                                                                               
24 A  detailed analysis of the arguments offered respectively by  peripheralists and by centralists cannot 
be developed here. See James (1890), II, ch XXVI and  Jeannerod, 1983, ch. VI, for a review of this 
controversy.  See Gandivia, 1987, for a recent defense of a centralist perspective.   
25 Stein et al., (1995), Blakemore et al., (1998). 
26 Another aspect of the conscious experience of agency emphasized in Blakemore et al. (2001)  is 
the attenuation of self-induced auditory or somatosensory sensations. This is why one cannot 
tickle oneself. 
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its content correctly, but fails to perceive it as self-generated. In those cases, the 
agent lacks the impression of "being in charge"; she may further perceive incorrectly 
that some particular action of hers has been performed through her, rather than by 
her27. Note that the problem originates at a perceptual level, and not at a conceptual 
one : the perceiver eventually fails to attribute to herself an action because she 
initially failed to perceive the marker of effort while she acted, not because her access 
to mental concepts is defective28. Although such an agent is able to perceive the 
intentional content of her current action, and acts intentionally, she does not 
perceive it as self-generated, but rather as other-generated (for lack of an internal 
feedforward model of her action, if the supposition above is empirically correct).29  
A symmetrical delusion in schizophrenic patients consists in perceiving others' 
intentions as their own. In such a case, a patient may be induced to take up someone 
else's role by completing or echoing the perceived action. Again, the difficulty may 
arise from the unability to discriminate, among predictable stimuli, those that are 
contingent on one's own intentions.30  
 
Perceving one's Intentions and Self-Knowledge 
 
If the view defended here is right, then it sheds a new light on the role of perception 
in so-called introspective knowledge, more exactly as a precursor of self-knowledge. 
As many philosophers have claimed,31 a belief concerning the self cannot be gained 
perceptually as if the self were a thing one observes in one's environment. There is no 
such thing as introspection, if by "introspection" is meant an inspection directed to 
internal states. Still a world-directed kind of perception may be a source of 
                                                 
27 Some patients seem on the contrary to misperceive intentions where there are none, that is,to look at 
the world as permeated with  cues for a possible action. We will not address here the details of the 
pathology. See Proust (2000a) for a discussion of the current theories. 
28  On this question, cf. Feinberg, I., (1978), Campbell, (1999),  Proust, ( 2000a). 
29 This case has been contrasted in Frith et al., (2000)  with the symmetrical case of the anarchic hand 
sign. In the latter case, the hand contralateral to a lesion in the SMA performs goal-directed movements 
which are, so to speak, unintended and intrusive. Although the patient perceives the intentional 
content of these movements, she does not perceive them as caused by alien forces. Such a patient has a 
problem of control, while the schizophrenic patient has a problem of awareness of control. 
30 One might speculate that this problem might result from an over-activity of the parietal area, leading 
a subject to reinterpret other people's intentions in egocentric terms. Cf. Jeannerod,  (1999b). 
31 See among others Evans (1982),  Shoemaker (1996). 
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knowledge about oneself, as Evans already appreciated.32 A paradigmatic "internal" 
state like intention can be directly perceived in the world, whether by the agent or by 
an observer, in the dynamic pattern of the subject's interaction with objects and 
people. Moreover, a specific marker in the developing pattern allows an agent 
discriminate among various features in the scene those changes contingent on her 
action, giving her simultaneously a distinctive feeling of agency. Such a feeling is a 
constitutive part of the experience of self-directed perception-in-action. When the 
complex informational processing mechanism underlying the identification of 
self-generated changes is defective, the agent is no longer able to detect her own 
agency in the outer world. She becomes subjectively  "acted through". 
 Shoemaker (1996) discusses a similar case in an argument to the effect that 
self-blindness about intentions is incoherent. According to him, the potential 
incoherence of the case inheres in the fact that a subject has to possess an integrated 
self to disavow an intention; otherwise the case might be described as involving two 
subjects in a single body, the "agent" and the "agnostic" (that is,the person 
disavowing the intentions). These two roles only qualify as facets of one person if the 
agnostic's beliefs and desires do rationalize the agent's actions and if she (the 
agnostic) has the corresponding knowledge. Shoemaker concludes that it is 
necessary to have introspective knowledge to one's beliefs and desires "if one is to 
have any access at all to one's intentions, volitions, and actions"33. 
Such a conclusion is much too strong, however. If the view defended here is correct, 
then one can have a perceptual access to one's intentions, at least in the restricted 
case of simple physical actions, even though no access to the (conceptual) content of 
one's beliefs or desires is currently available, just as one can have access to others' 
intentions in a direct perceptual way, without further information concerning the 
observed agents. Concepts of types of action, as well as inferences from objects to 
affordances, will allow for the categorization of the perceived contents and for the 
prediction of behaviour in others in a richer way, as was acknowledged ealier. The 
point is that informational access to intentions is not constrained by the possession 
of concepts.  
                                                 
32 "Any informational state in which the subject has information about the world is ipso facto a 
state in which he has information about himself, of the kind we are discussing, available to him. 
It is of the utmost importance to appreciate that in order to understand the self-ascription of 
experience we need to postulate no special faculty of inner sense or internal self-scanning" 
(Evans, 1982, 230).  
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When a schizophrenic patient denies having  acted with a particular intention, and 
even having acted at all, he/she may or not have beliefs and desires rationalizing  the 
corresponding type of action. Where she does not, we might be  tempted to say that 
she has grounds for supposing that some other agent (with the relevant rationalizing 
beliefs and desires) made her act. But this temptation should be resisted, because the 
impression of being or not the agent in one's actions is  not inferred from what one 
believes and desires. It is a genuine, direct feeling, experienced dynamically in the 
changing world, a feeling functionally independent from the specific content of the 
corresponding intention. A patient may in fact feel "acted through" in actions she 
values as well as in actions she loathes. 
Another difficulty plaguing discussion of self-blindness about intentions consists in 
the failure to distinguish several levels in self-knowledge. Although it is tempting, and 
in many cases right to say that the mechanism for perceiving one's intentions is a 
source of self-knowledge, it is not entirely correct. An agent only may, properly 
speaking, have self-knowledge if she can form first-person thoughts, namely, 
thoughts referring to the person having that thought according to a token-reflexive 
rule, and if she is able to apply this rule in a general way, that is, as  available to other 
subjects.34  An agent may, however, have thoughts that are in fact about himself 
without realizing that he is having them; not only in the sense in which Oedipus 
thinks that whoever slayed Laius should die, that is, while utterly  failing to capture 
any reflexivity in the thought content, which, unknown to the thinker,  is in fact 
reflexive; but in the sense in which an agent may  build up self-directed thoughts  
while failing to have a concept of self. These latter thoughts can be said to be 
self-directed either because they allow practical reflexivity to develop - as when an 
agent identifies the target of a threat as herself, and flees; or because their content is 
such that it involves the agent essentially (like proprioceptive informational states). 
The important point is that full-blown self-knowledge would not be possible if there 





                                                                                                                                               
33 Shoemaker (1996), 235. 
34Cf Evans's Generality constraint (1982, 209). 
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